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WEATHERING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL




The initial signs of a foundering American subp rime mortgage market
have proven to be merely the tip of the iceberg of dubious financial prod-
ucts and practices leading to the present economic crisis. In this time of
heightened financial inquiry and reform, it is worth examining the impact
of the financial crisis on the Canadian economy, as it has been markedly
different from the American experience. Noteworthy is the fact that Cana-
dian financial systems appear to have been remarkably insulated from
much of the financial storm. This paper argues that Canadian resilience
can largely be attributed to a more conservative regulatory environment,
which curtailed much of the problematic behavior that has led the world to
the point of financial crisis. Not an exhaustive study, this paper provides
an overview of the impacts of the economic crisis on Canada and highlights
key factors that have contributed to the Canadian experience.
I. INTRODUCTIONRUMBLINGS of an unsteady American subprime mortgage mar-
ket in early 2007 have since cascaded into an economic crisis of
global proportions, epitomized by the financial failure of numer-
ous banks and corporations, as well as prodigious government bailouts of
those entities deemed too large to fail. Even now, some two years later,
many countries remain in the throes of this "global financial crisis," as it
continues to negatively impact national economies, thereby affecting
nearly every aspect of society. While the financial crisis has not left any
country entirely unscathed, the last couple of years have demonstrated
the disparate effects of the financial turmoil on numerous countries
around the globe-generating curiosity as to the reasons for its differing
impact and whether the particular features of the "less affected" econo-
*Research is current to July 2009.
**Virginia E. Torrie, J.D., is an LL.M. student writing her thesis in the areas of secur-
ities law, commercial bankruptcy, and insolvency law at Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University (Toronto, Canada). The author is most grateful to Professor Ben-
jamin Geva fur his valuable comments and suggestions. All errors are the aiuthor's
own. Comments on this article are welcomed. Email: virgin iatorrie@osgoode.
yorku.ca.
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mies might serve as useful examples for a global economic community in
the midst of heightened financial inquiry and reform.'
Canada is one example of a country that has been less affected by the
recent financial crisis than other similarly situated economies. A Western
industrialized nation, Canada shares much in common with its fellow
members of the G8 and Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD"), including and most specifically, its neighbor to
the south, the United States. Nevertheless, the impact of the financial
crisis on the Canadian economy has been markedly different from the
American experience. The extent and severity of this global financial cri-
sis has impacted and continues to impact the relatively small Canadian
economy; however, what is noteworthy is that Canadian financial systems
appear to have been remarkably more insulated from the crisis than
most. As will be discussed in more depth in the sections that follow, this
paper argues that this resilience can largely be attributed to a more con-
servative Canadian regulatory environment, which curtailed much of the
problematic behavior that was the genesis of today's global financial
crisis.
The factors that contributed to the global financial crisis the world is
facing today are many and complex, as are the reasons for the differing
impacts felt in national economies around the world. While it would be
an oversimplification to boil the latter down to a single deciding factor,
this comes very near the truth in the case of Canada. This article argues
that in Canada, prudent government regulation has played the star role in
mitigating the extent and severity of the impact of this financial storm on
Canadian financial systems and the Canadian economy. Further, within
the realm of Canadian regulatory control, where the economic impact of
the financial crisis on Canada have been drastic, it can for the most part
be directly linked to regulatory failure. Notwithstanding its regulatory
shield, Canada's economy has suffered in many areas that are heavily in-
terconnected with those of other countries through world trade and fi-
nance: softening American demand for Canadian exports, which are
1. See, e.g., Simon Carswell, Canadian Bank System Gets the Balance Right, IRISH
TIMES, July 3, 2009, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/
2009/0703/1224249968139.html; Pay Jordan, Canada Finance: Canadian Banks in
Capital Markets Push, REUTERS (Toronto), June 25, 2009, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE5503N420090625; Helen Avery, Can
Canada's Banks Seize Their Chance?, EUROMONEY MAG., June 8, 2009, available
at http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2228800/Can-Canadas-banks-seize-their-
chance.html; Tara Perkins & Boyd Erman, Why Canadian Banks Work, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Can.), Mar. 7, 2009, at BI; Erik Heinrich, Why Canada's Banks Don't
Need Help, TIME, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1855317,00.html; Keith B. Richburg, Worldwide Financial Crisis
Largely Bypasses Canada, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/15/AR2008101503321. html;
Jonathan Kay, The Financial Crisis for Dummies: Why Canada Is Immune from a
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densely concentrated in the logging, oil, mining, natural gas, and automo-
tive sectors, has reverberated through the Canadian economy, particu-
larly affecting employment opportunities; downsizing and bankrupt
American companies with Canadian offices and subsidiaries have further
taken their toll on the Canadian labor market; and instability in world
credit markets has limited the availability of business financing for Cana-
dian companies, adding further challenges to surviving the financial
storm.
At the time that the American subprime mortgage crisis was making
headlines around the globe, there was a fledgling subprime mortgage
market in Canada. When foreclosures started to snowball in the United
States, Canadian foreclosure rates did not experience the same spikes.
Rather, rates remained near record lows. Later, in the autumn of 2008,
when several large American banks collapsed or were teetering on the
brink of bankruptcy, most of the largest Canadian banks turned a profit
and not a single Canadian bank received a government bailout.
Curiosity notwithstanding, there is as yet very little academic writing
on the global financial crisis that deals directly with its impact on Canada
but, as the crisis is still ongoing, this is not surprising. 2 Even at this early
point in time, however, there is a great deal of insight to be offered
through a careful study of the Canadian experience. Accordingly, though
not an exhaustive study of the complete "Canadian Experience," this pa-
per will provide a general overview of the impact of the global financial
crisis on Canada and outline the major factors that have contributed to
the resilience of the Canadian economy in the midst of a global financial
crisis.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II sets the stage
for the discussion by giving an overview of the Canadian economy, focus-
2. As of this writing, the author has been unable to find any published academic
writing that deals broadly with this question, though several recent articles examin-
ing issues related to this topic have been identified. See, e.g., Fred Myers & Alexa
Abiscott, Asset Backed Commercial Paper: Why the Courts Got It Right, 25 BANK-
INC; & FIN. L.R. 5 (2009), Jeffrey Carhart & Jay Hoffman, Canada's Asset Backed
Commercial Paper Restructu ring: 2007-2009, 25 BANKING & FIN. L.R. 35 (2009);
Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang. Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper 09/152, 2009), available at http://imf.org/external-
pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09 152.pdf; Christopher C. Nicholls, FINANCIAL INS-rurIoNS:
THE REGULATrORY FRAMEWORK 181-221 (2008); Blair W. Keefe & Wesley Isaacs,
CDIC Granted Extraordinary Powers over Troubled Institutions, 24 BANKING &
FIN. L.R. 539 (2008); Geoff R. Hall, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper and the 'In-
tention of Parliament' in the Ontario Court of Appeal, 47 CAN. Bus. L.J. 54 (2008);
Janis Sarra, Restructuring of the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Market in Ca-
nada, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 315 (2008); Mario Forte, Re Met-
calfe: A Matter of Fraud, Fairness, and Reasonableness. The Restructuring of the
Third-Party Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market in Canada, 17 INT'L INSOL-
VENCY REV. 211 (2008); Martin Boyer & Franqois Girard, Les titres adosses d des
creances hypothtecaires: le marche amt/ricain et le marclu/ canadien [Mortgage-
backed securities: the American experience and the Canadian experience], 76:1 INS.
& RISK MGm-r. 55 (2008); Martin Boyer & Franqois Girard, Les titres adosses d des
cr~ances hypothecaires: caractceristiques et proprites [Mortgage-backed securities:
characteristics and properties], 75:4 INS. & RISK MGMT. 521 (2008).
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ing on capital markets and financial systems structures and regulation,
with relevant comparisons and contrasts to their American counterparts
where appropriate. This section focuses on key features of the Canadian
economy and regulatory structures which contributed to the unique im-
pact of the financial crisis on Canada. Section III outlines the impact of
the global financial crisis on Canada and highlights some of the corre-
sponding government responses to these unfolding circumstances. Sec-
tion IV provides a brief conclusion.
11. COMPARATIVE AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
FINANCIAL REGULATION 101
A. BASIC CONTRASTS: THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 3
The United States boasts the fourth largest landmass, with an estimated
305.15 million people and a population density of approximately eighty-
three people per square mile.4 By contrast, Canada is the second largest
country by landmass, with an estimated population of a mere 33.21 mil-
lion people and a comparatively roomy population density of 8.6 people
per square mile, making Canada one of the most sparsely populated
countries in the world.5 While at first blush these facts appear far re-
moved from a discussion of financial systems regulation and economic
crisis,6 they are in fact fundamental to understanding the unique features
and development of the Canadian economy. Through a basic under-
standing of Canada and the Canadian economy, the differences in the
American and Canadian experiences of the financial crisis begin to come
into sharper focus, informed by an underlying knowledge of socio-politi-
cal factors that extend beyond Wall and Bay Streets.7
The Canadian economy is largely based on the services industry, which
employs approximately seventy-five percent of Canadians; however, Ca-
3. Present day United States and Canada pose many interesting points for
comparison and contrast; both are relatively young countries by global standards
with a common British heritage and share many similar practices and customs.
Taking a broader view of the history ot European settlement of North America,
the United States and Canada are perhaps better understood not merely as two
distinct countries, but also as products of an ideological (and physical) bifurcation
of settlers to North America beginning some 200 years ago. In other words, in
comparing and contrasting these two countries it is often helpful to consider that
the points of similarity and difference seen in our governments, legal systems and
economies often stem from the overlapping or diverging viewpoints of two groups
of people, rather than from these societal institutions themselves.
4. United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE 1, 1 (2009), http://www.
search.eb.com.ezp roxy.lIi bra ry.york u.ca/eb/a rticle-91 11233 (roughly 32 people/kn 2 ;
figures based on 2008 estimate).
5. Canada, in ENCYCLOPE1DIA BRITANNICA ONLINE 1, 1 (2009), http://www.search.eb.
com. ezp roxy.Ii bra ry. york u.ca/eb/a rticIe-91 10588 (roughly 3.3 people/kn 2 ; figures
based on 2008 estimate).
6. In this article the terms "economic crisis," "financial crisis." are used interchangea-
bly to refer broadly to the difficulties facing national economies and financial sys-
tems around the world today.
7. Bay Street in Toronto is representative of Canadian big business and high finance,
as is Wall Street in New York for the United States.
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nada is unique among western industrialized nations for its disproportion-
ately large focus on the primary sector, particularly logging, oil, natural
gas and mining activities. 8 Canada is the world's largest exporter of pulp
and paper-a world leader in the production of softwood lumber, ura-
nium, zinc, nickel, and titanium; a major producer of iron ore, coal, petro-
leum, gold, copper, silver and lead; and is home to significant diamond
mining operations. 9 Canada also has the world's second largest oil
reserves as well as vast offshore natural gas reserves.' 0 The Canadian
manufacturing sector is also sizeable, comprising twenty percent of the
gross domestic product and employing fourteen percent of the Canadian
labor force."I Within the manufacturing sector, the automotive industry
has been a key area, especially in Southern Ontario and Quebec.'12
International trade, particularly exports, plays a significant role in the
Canadian economy, a fact that is further highlighted by the sensitivity of
many primary sector industries to global price fluctuations.'13 The United
States is Canada's largest trading partner and accounts for approximately
seventy-five percent of all Canadian trade, with exports considerably out-
weighing imports.' 4 Due to its heavy reliance on the United States as the
primary purchaser of exports, Canada's economy has the propensity to
rise and fall with American demand and international trade policies. For-
mer Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, aptly described this
phenomenon as follows: "Living next to [the United States] is in some
ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-
tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch
and grunt."' 5
Since the latter half of 2007, the suffering United States economy has
led to weakening American demand for Canada's primary exports. With
new home and commercial construction slowing to a near halt, the de-
mand for Canadian lumber has also fallen. T1he flight of American con-
sumers from the marketplace for large gas-guzzling trucks and SUVs has
also lessened demand for Canadian gas, oil, automotive components, and
new vehicles. Further, the financial failures of General Motors and
Chrysler, both with an array of sizeable Canadian manufacturing and as-
sembly plants, and considerable domestic automotive subcomponent
manufacturing suppliers, have taken a toll on the Canadian economy.
The last few years have served to illustrate for Canadians how interwoven
the economies of the United States and Canada are, and the inherent
risks of relying heavily on one trading partner to purchase Canadian
exports.
8. Canada, supra note 5, at 28, 30, 31.
9. Id. at 28, 30.
10. Id. at 31.
11. Id. at 32.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 34.
15. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Former Prime Minister of Canada, Address to the Press
Club in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 1969).
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B. MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
Differing regulatory frameworks employed in the two countries can ac-
count for much of the disparity apparent in the impact of the financial
crisis on the United States and Canada. In the most basic terms, the
American regulation In question allowed, or perhaps even encouraged,
greater financial risk taking than comparable Canadian regulation. Risk
taking is an essential component of a capitalist financial system, and the
dichotomy of the American and Canadian approaches can be understood
As two points on a spectrum of risk tolerance.
Some of the key regulatory features that influenced the proliferation of
subprime mortgages, asset backed securities, and highly leveraged invest-
ment portfolios in the United States include the following. Note the con-
trast between the American and Canadian positions on many of these
points.
Income tax and home mortgages. American income tax law permits
homeowners to deduct the interest portion of their mortgage payments
from their personal federal income tax.' 6 This feature, among other
things, arguably provides an incentive for consumers to hold larger mort-
gages on their homes for longer periods of time, thus paying more inter-
est (perhaps at higher rates) over the life of the mortgage than they
otherwise would. In Canada, there is no similar income tax deduction for
consumer mortgages. As a result, there is no artificial incentive to hold a
mortgage, which might possibly influence consumer decisions when it
comes to purchasing a home.
Subprime mortgage lending. Prior to the outbreak of the subprime
mortgage crisis in 2007, American law placed few substantive limits on
subprime mortgage lending, a fact that is largely due to decentralized reg-
ulators coupled with deregulation of the American financial services in-
dustry over the last few decades. 17 The development of aggressive
mortgage brokers in this market served to illustrate for the world how
inadequate the regulatory checks and balances for this industry truly
were. While the specific terms and conditions of American subprime
mortgages varied widely, the most notable features were that they could
be granted for as much as, and sometimes more than, 100% of the value
16. l.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D), 163(h)(3), 163(h)(4) (2008).
17. See Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 27:3
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 5 (2008); John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money
for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. Subprinie Mortgage
Markets 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper 07/188, 2007), available at http:I/
www.imf.org/external/pubsft/wp/2007/wpO7lI88.pdf (A number of legal develop-
ments facilitated the development and growth of subprime mortgage lending, in-
cluding: the overriding of state interest rate caps by federal regulation in 1980; the
legal permissibility of offering adjustable rate mortgages starting 1982; the passing
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, resulting in mortgage interest as the only consumer
loan interest that is tax deductible: and, the development of automated underwrit-
ing and securitization in the mortgage market.).
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of the property purchase price,' 8 that the financial requirements for bor-
rowers were generally quite low-as epitomized by the proliferation of
so-called "ninja" (an acronym for "no income, no job, nio assets") mort-
gages, a term used to describe mortgages sold to borrowers that appeared
financially ill-equipped to maintain a mortgage in good standing,'9 and
that the ostensible gaps in regulatory oversight were often used to the
advantage of mortgage brokers and lenders whom, after setting up bor-
rowers with subprime mortgages, repackaged these consumer receivables
into mortgage-backed securities, (MBS) which were sold to eager inves-
tors on Wall Street and around the world. 20
Canadian law, by contrast, generally requires a minimum down pay-
ment of twenty percent of the purchase price in order to qualify for a
consumer mortgage on real property. 2'I A mortgage obtained with a
down payment of less than twenty percent is considered to be a "sub-
prime mortgage" in Canadian terms. In exceptional circumstances where
the borrower is considered to be financially well-qualified, a down pay-
ment of less than twenty percent and as little as five percent of the
purchase price may be used to obtain mortgage financing. 22 In such
cases, the full value of the mortgage must be insured through Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) .2 3 CMHC is a Crown cor-
poration, meaning that it is the Canadian government that takes the risk
on the borrower defaulting on their mortgage, and the lending institution
has guaranteed repayment. As a result of a fairly conservative regulatory
framework and a much smaller mortgage market, subprime mortgage
lending in Canada has not developed as rapidly as it has in the United
States and was still in its infancy when the subprime crisis emerged. Sub-
prime mortgages accounted for only five percent of outstanding mort-
gages in Canada in June 2007, while in the United States they reached
nearly three times that number .24 Partially as a result of imposing higher
financial requirements on potential borrowers, which is one indicator of
18. See, e.g.. Scott Frame, Andreas Lehnert & Ned Prescott. A Snapshot of Mortgage
Conditions with an Emphasis on Subprimne Mortgage Performance, U.S. FED. RES.,
Aug. 27, 2008, at 20 tbl. I, available at http://federalreserveonline.org/pdf/MF-
Knowledge-Snapshot-082708.pdf.
19. Douglas W. Arner, The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences, 43
INT'L LAW. 91, 107 (2009); Steven Pearistein, 'No Money Down' Falls Flat, WASH.
Pos-r, Mar. 14, 2007, at DOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
con ten t/article/2007/0313/A R200703 1301t733. html.
20. See, e.g., Aaron Unterman. Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitiza-
tion of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTIINGS Bus. L.J. 77, 77-134 (2008); Kathleen C.
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAm L. REv. 2039, 2045-48 (2007).
21. Bank Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 46 § 418 (Can.).
22. Id. at § 418(2); National Housing Act, R.S.C., ch. N-1I § 17.1 (1985); CAN. MORT-
GAGE & Hous. CORP., INNOVATIVE FINANCING OI-riONS, http://www.cmhc-schl.
gc.ca/en/corplabout/whwedo/crvihecocrviheco001.cfm#CPJUMP33046 (last
visited Aug. 29. 2009).
23. CAN. MORTGAGE ANI) Hous. CORI,., ARE You FINANCIALLY READ:Y?, http:l/
www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/co/buho/hostst/hostst_002.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
24. Nicholls, suipra note 2, at 186; Canadian Mortgages, SPECIAL UPDATE (Scotiabank
Group Global Econ. Res., Toronto. Can.). Sept. 25, 2008, at 1.
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the borrower's financial ability to afford a mortgage, mortgage delin-
quencies in Canada have remained very low in the years following the
outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, hovering around 0.42%.25
Beyond imposing more rigorous lending requirements, the creation of
MBS in Canada is largely performed in accordance with the carefully
crafted guidelines set out by CMHC and the resulting securities are fully
guaranteed by the Government of Canada.26 CMHC is not responsible
for creating MBS itself; rather, securitization is accomplished through pri-
vate issuers. 27 CMHC's issuer eligibility requirements set out the stan-
dards and practices that must be met by eligible issuers in order to avail
themselves of the CMHC program.281 Eligible MBS are then assigned to
CMHC in trust for MBS investors.29
In addition to the Canadian legal requirements surrounding subprime
mortgage lending, it is worth noting the more conservative attitudes to-
ward mortgage lending in Canada. Canadian lenders have closely ad-
hered to traditional borrower criteria when it comes to mortgage lending.
The borrower' s income and financial assets (as well as the income and
financial assets of a co-signor or guarantor where applicable) are ordina-
rily the pivotal pieces of information in the decision to approve or deny a
mortgage application. Due to the fact that Canadian lenders have tended
to err on the side of caution, the Canadian government utilizes mortgage
insurance as an inducement for lenders to grant mortgages in situations
where they would ordinarily not do so. Thus, by the Canadian govern-
ment assuming the risks of default through mortgage insurance, the
rather conservative lender feels comfortable extending the mortgage.
The more cautious Canadian attitude is exemplified through the fact that,
while it is not a legal requirement, it is common practice for Canadian
lending institutions to require mortgage insurance for down payments
that sit at or slightly above the twenty percent minimum.30 The upshot of
this approach to personal mortgage lending is that it will usually be more
difficult for a Canadian homebuyer to obtain mortgage financing, and as
much financing, than it would be for a similarly situated American
homebuyer.
As an additional matter, Canada has benefited from higher real prop-
erty appraisal standards in general, which tended to more conservatively
25. CANADIAN BANKERS Assoc., CANADA'S STRONG BANKING SYSTEM: BENEFIT-
TING CANADIANS, http://www.cba.ca/index.php?option=com-content&view=arti-
cle&catid=50&id=469&Itemid=56&lang=en (last visited Aug. 29, 2009) (These are
the figure for seven largest banks for the month of July 2009).
26. The NHA Mortgage-Backed Securities Guide 2006, 2006 CAN. MORTGAGE AND:
Hous. CORP. 1-3. available at http://www.cmhc-schl .gc.calen/hoficlincl/mobase/up
load/NHA-MBS-Guide.pdf; CAN. MORTGAGE AND) Hous. CORP'., WHAT IS MBS?,
http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/hoficlincl/mobase/mobase_00I.cfm (last visited
Sept. 9, 2009).
27. The NHA Mortgage-Backed Securities Guide 2006, supra note 26, at 1-3.
28. Id. at 1-3, 3-1. 3-2, 3-3. 3-4, 3-5.
29. Id.
30. Canadian Mortgages. supra note 24, at 2, 3.
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estimate real property values before determining how much to lend to a
prospective borrower.3' The higher standards combined with the fact
that there were very few subprime mortgages in Canada, which facilitated
a flurry of home buying activity in the United States, helped ensure that
Canadian housing prices were not artificially inflated, as has turned out to
be the case in the United States.32 As a result, when doubtful and bad
subprime mortgages were exposed in the United States in summer 2007,
there was no corresponding substantial drop in Canadian real estate
prices. Rather, while some areas experienced price declines, real estate
prices in most Canadian cities held steady or continued to grow.33
In the United States, the subprime mortgage crisis can be traced to the
convergence of two primary factors: a large number of subprime mort-
gages and a widespread and severe drop in real estate prices.34 Due to
regulatory and market differences explained above, the Canadian real es-
tate market was not broadly characterized by these two features, which
helps to explain why Canada has not experienced a Canadian subprime
mortgage crisis.
Lender remedies. In the United States, mortgage lender recourse fol-
lowing foreclosure of residential properties varies according to state laws
to a greater extent than is generally the case among Canadian prov-
inces.35 While the American remedy of foreclosure is federally uniform,
state laws differ in the recourse available to lenders who foreclose in neg-
ative equity situations. 36 While most states allow the lender to obtain a
3t. Id1. at 3: Since the writing of this article, Canadian news media has highlighted
concerns about the possibility of a Canadian housing bubble, similar to that exper-
ienced in the United States a short while ago. Very low interest rates (e.g. 2.25%
for a five-year variable rate mortgage offered by the Bank of Montreal, November
12, 2009) are believcd to be a contributing factor to the rash of home buying activ-
ity in Canadian cities, such as Toronto and Vancouver. News articles typically re-
port on the fierce bidding wars over newly listed houses and the waiving of
conditions of sale, such as a home inspection. Indeed, bidding wars appear to be
increasingly common in the Toronto market, often driving the selling price several
hundred thousand dollars above the asking price. In light of these circumstances,
concern has been expressed regarding the ability of new homebuyers to afford
their mortgages, as national unemployment continues to grow and interest rates
eventually increase. See e.g., Tony Wong, Mortgage lender warns of housing bulb-
ble, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 2009, at BI; Tara Perkins, et at., Raising the roof.
why easy credit and soaring house prices are rousing new fears, THE GLOBE ANI)
MAIL, Oct. 31, 2009, at Bt.
32. Benoit Durocher, The Impact of the Financial Crisis in Canada, ECONOMIC VIEW-
POINT, Oct. 14, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.desjardins.com/en/a-proposl
etudes-economiquesfactualites/point-vue-economique/pve8l1014.pdf; see DEPT. OF
FIN. CAN., CANADA'S Hous., MORTG.AGE ANI) CREDIT MKTs. 2 (2008), available
at http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/images/Canadian-Housing-Mortgage-Market-En.ppt.
33. Durocher, supra note 32, at 2; DEPT. OF FIN. CAN., supra note 32, at 2.
34. Durocher, supra note 32, at 2; DEP'r. OF FIN. CAN., supra note 32, at 2.
35. Alberta excepted.
36. 12 U.S.C § 375t (t994). For examples of states' legislation that provides differently
than the ordinary federal foreclosure process see, Andra C. Ghent & Marianna
Kudlyak. Evidence from U.S. States, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond Working
Paper No. 09-10, 41-52), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/re-
sea rch/worki ng-.papers2009/pd f/wpO9- I 0.pd I (citing ALASKA STAT. 34 Ch. 20
§ 100 (West 2008); ARiz. REV. STA-r. 33 Ch. 6, Art. 2 (West 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE
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deficiency judgment, some states preclude this remedy altogether or set
out specific (and often onerous) criteria that must be met in order to
obtain such a judgment.37 Certain states further limit the amount of defi-
ciency judgments according to the fair market value of the property.38
Moreover, in some cases, debtors may be able to shield their other assets
from the mortgage lender, or state law may protect the debtors' wages
from garnishment.39
In contrast to the United States, the legal recourse available to lenders
in Canada is generally uniform and more easily enforced, which in turn
affects the financial ramifications for the lender in the case of a delin-
quency. As a general rule, Canadian law provides that the borrower is
legally obligated to pay the outstanding amount of the existing mortgage,
regardless of the value of the mortgage collateral, and lender remedies
extend to a debtor's other assets and income. 4 0 As a result, even in the
midst of the present financial crisis, not only is delinquency a rarity in the
Canadian context, it is even more uncommon for borrowers to walk away
from their home.4 1
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 4 2 There has been no definitive
empirical evidence that the CRA contributed to the recent proliferation
of high risk lending in the United States, though this question has been a
point of controversy in recent years as a result of an environment of fi-
nancial inquiry and reform efforts. 4 3 In outlining the impacts of the fi-
§§ 2920-2944 (West 1993); IOWA CODE § 654.6 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 580-582 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. 71-1-232 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.36, 38 (West 2007)).
37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (West 2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33.6.2 (West
2007), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2920-44 (West 1993); IOWA CODE § 654.6 (West 1995);
MINN. STAT. §§ 580-582 (West 2000), MONT. CODE ANN. §71.1.232 (2009).
38. See, e.g., Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 36, at 4, 41; ARK. CODE ANN. § 18.50.112
(2009).
39. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 36, at 5, 43, 49, (citing FLA. STATr. § 40.702; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.36, 38).
40. For applicable Ontario law see Courts of Justice Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s. 64;
see generally, Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40; John Kiff, Canadian Residential
Mortgage Markets: Boring But Effective? (IMF Working Paper 09/130, 11, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1426449.
41. DEPr. OF FIN. CAN., supra note 32, at 5 (As of 01 2008 only 0.3% of Canadian
mortgages were ninety days in arrears, compared to 4.5% of American mortgages
in the same period).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2009). The CRA is an American federal law that is aimed at
encouraging commercial banks as well as savings and loan associations to help
meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate. This law is partic-
ularly concerned with low-and moderate-income neighborhoods. See FED. RE-
SERVE BOARD, COMTY. REINVESTMENT AcT, (2009), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/dcca/cra.
43. See, e.g., R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis-Cause, Effect and Conse-
quences, 17-SPG J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 219 (2008), 219-234 at
221-222; FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, THE CRA AND SUBPRIME LENDING:
DISCERNING THE DIFFERENCE (2009), http://www.dallasfed.org/ca/bcp/2009/bcp
0901.cfm; NEIL BHUTTA AND GLENN B. CANNER, DID THE CRA CAUSE THE
MORTGAGE MARKET MELTDOWN?, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (2009), www.minneap-
olisfed.org/research/pub-display.cfm?id=4136.
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nancial crisis on Canada, it is merely worth noting that there is no
comparable Canadian law to the American CRA.
Bank Assets and Balance Sheets. Prior to the outbreak of the subprime
mortgage crisis, American banks routinely moved riskier assets (and lia-
bilities) off the balance sheet, a practice that had the effect of reducing
the level of risk apparent to regulators and the public, (though, as the
economic crisis has shown, banks were not totally insulated from risks
associated with these off balance sheet assets). 4 4 By contrast, Canadian
banks were neither as active in the subprime mortgage market, nor in
securitization programs that moved such assets and liabilities off the bal-
ance sheet. (In this regard, Canadian bank practices can be largely attrib-
uted to differing regulatory capitalization requirements as discussed
below.) The movement of banks' assets into off-balance sheet formats
was fostered in part due to the use of mortgage securitization and the
"4originate to distribute" model employed by many American mortgage
originators, factors which were not so prevalent in the Canadian mort-
gage market where lenders have a much greater tendency to hold onto
the mortgages they originate .45 As a result, only approximately twenty-
nine percent of Canadian subprime mortgages have been securitized,
contrasted with the roughly sixty percent of American residential mort-
gages. 46 Moreover, the Government of Canada, through CMHC, essen-
tially guarantees approximately ninety-two percent of Canadian MB S. 4 7
Accordingly, neither Canadian banks, nor investors in Canadian MBS
were faced with as heavily leveraged risks as American banks and Ameri-
can MBS investors .4 8
Bank Regulation .49 Bank regulation in Canada differs in a number of
significant respects from bank regulation in the United States. Though
the summary that follows only scratches the surface, it highlights a num-
ber of key differences in American and Canadian bank regulation .5 0
44. See generally, Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039 (2007).
45. CANADIAN BANKERS Assoc., supra note 25, at 2-3.
46. Kiff, sutpra note 40, at 5. These figures are current to June 2009.
47. Id.
48. Canadian Mortgages, supra note 24, at 3.
49. The framework of bank regulation in Canada and the United States is quite obvi-
ously far more intricate than is briefly described here. For a more comprehensive
overview of Canadian bank regulation, see, e.g., Nicholls, supra note 2; BRADLEY
CRAWFORD, THE LAW OF BANKING AND PAYMENT IN CANADA, looseleaf (Aurora,
Ontario: Canada Law Book. 2008) vols. 1-3. For an overview of American bank-
ing regulation see, e.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATlION,
looseleaf (1995); JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD Sco-rr
CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, (3d ed. 2001).
50. The term "bank" in the Canadian context is used to refer to federally chartered
and regulated commercial banks. Note, however, that a smaller, though neverthe-
less important, cohort of financial institutions in Canada are comprised of trust
companies and cooperative institutions (credit unions and caisses populaires). The
regulation of these financial institutions is not discussed here. but see, Nicholls,
supra note 2, at 21, 135-43.
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At the outset, it is worth noting that Canadian banks, though not
nearly as large as the most prominent American banks, are not so much
smaller as to entirely preclude a careful comparison. Illustrative is the
case of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), recently ranked the twelfth largest
bank by market capitalization in the world (C$80 billion/US$73 billion).5'
To situate this in the context of the American banking landscape, this
puts RBC behind American banks JP Morgan, Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, and Goldman Sachs in terms of market capitalization.52
In Canada, regulatory oversight of banks is achieved by a single federal
regulator, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, through the Office
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OFSI). 53 Prudential reg-
ulation of Canadian banks is achieved through several channels, includ-
ing: the federal Bank Act, the associated regulations to the Bank Act,
guidelines issued by OFSI, as well as through less formal OFSI communi-
cations, such as letters to Canadian banks on behalf of the Superinten-
dent of Financial Institutions.54 Recently, the Canadian approach to
bank regulation, once criticized for being too conservative, has proven to
be quite sensible with its fairly robust system of regulation, a fact that
suddenly received international recognition when the World Economic
Forum ranked Canadian banks the soundest in the world for two consec-
utive years during the economic crisis.55
Capitalization requirements are one of the most significant measures
by which regulators help mitigate bank risk and foster prudential banking
practices. According to regulatory requirements, American banks must
maintain Tier one capital ratios of at least six percent, though in practice
many banks maintain Tier one capital ratios of at least seven percent.56
Canadian banks by contrast are required to have minimum Tier one capi-
tal ratios of seven percent.57 In practice, however, the five largest Cana-
51. ROYAL BANK OF CAN., RBC AT A GLANCE: FALL 2009, (2009) http://www.rbc.
com/investorrelations/pdf/qfq3_09.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Bank Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 46 § 418(2)(b) (Can.).
54. Id.; Nicholls, supra note 2, at 25-28, 102-03.
55. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-2009 1
(2009), http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%
20Report/index.htm (click "Download the Full Report"); WORLD ECONOMIC Fo-
RUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-2010 111 (2009), http://www.wefo-
rum.org/documents/GCR09/index.html.
56. See, e.g., BANK OF AM., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009) http://media.corporate-ir.
net/mediafiles/irol/71/71595/reports/2008_AR.pdf (In 2008, Bank of America's
tier 1 capital ratio was 9.5%); JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2009), http://investor.shareholder.com/common/download/download.cfm?com-
panyid=ONE&fileid=283416&filekey=66cc7ba-5410-43c4-b2Ob-181974bc6be6&
filename=2008_ARCompleteAR.pdf (In 2008, JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s Tier I
capital ratio was 10.9%); WELLS FARGO & CO., WELLS FARGO & Co. ANNUAL
REPORT 2008 3 (2009) https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest rela-
tions/wf2008annualreport.pdf (In 2008, Wells Fargo & Company's Tier I capital
ratio was 7.84%).
57. Bank Act § 485(1); Nicholls. supra note 2, at 102 n.36 (citing OFFICE OF THE SU-
PERINTENDENT OF FIN. INST. CAN., CAPITAL ADEOUACY REQUIREMENTS (CAR)
SIMPLER APPROACHEs-GUIDELINE A-I (2007), http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/Doc
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dian banks maintained Tier one ratios of nine percent and above, and
total capital ratios of over eleven percent for fiscal year 2008, easily ex-
ceeding the required minimums by several percentage points.58 By the
end of the third quarter 2009, these figures rose to 10.4% and above and
over 12.6% respectively.59
Additionally, Canadian banks must generally maintain a maximum "as-
sets to capital multiple" (ACM) of twenty to one. 60 This ratio cap means
that the assets of the bank must not be greater than twenty times the
bank's capital. 6 ' Unlike capital ratios, which measure regulatory capital
by risk-weighted assets, the ACM takes into account the total assets of
the bank, including some pertinent off-balance sheet items, and thus gives
a broader picture of bank risk than Tier One and total capitalization ra-
Repository/I /eng/guidelines/capital/guidelines/CAR-A1_e.pdf [hereinafter CAR
GUIDELINE]). Capital ratio is a measurement of capital adequacy that is calculated
by dividing regulatory capital by risk-weighted assets. See BASEL COMMITFEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASURE-
MENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 12 (2004), http://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm.
58. The five largest Canadian banks, known as the "Big Five," are the Royal Bank of
Canada (RBC), Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS),
Bank of Montreal (BMO), and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).
ROYAL BANK OF CAN., 2008 TIER I AND TOTAL CAPITAL RATIOS FOR BIG FIVE
ISANKS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 31 2009, http://www.rbc.comlinvestorrelatioin/
ir quarterly.html (In 2008, RBC's Tier 1 capital ratio was 9.0%; total capital ratio
was 11.1%); TORONTO-DoMINION BANK, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 57 2009, http://
www.td.com/ar2008/index.jsp (in 2008, TD Bank's Tier I capital ratio was 9.8%;
total capital ratio was 12%); BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 23
2009, http://scotiabank.com/cda/content/0, I 608,CI D7148_LI Den,00.html (in 2008,
BNS' Tier I capital ratio was 9.3%: total capital ratio was 11.1%); BANK OF MON-
TREAL, 191sr ANNUAL REPORT 2008 27 (2009), http://www2.bmo.com/content/
0,1263,divld-3_langld-1_navCode-3198,00.html#ArchivedAR (in 2008, BMO's
Tier I capital ratio was 9.77%; total capital ratio was 12.17%); CANADIAN IMPE-
RIAL BANK OF COMMERCE, CIBC ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2008 2
(2009). http://www.cibc.com/ca/investor-relations/annual-reports.htm (In 2008,
CIBC's Tier I capital ratio was 10.5%; total capital ratio was 15.4 %).
59. ROYAL BANK OF CAN., SUPPLEMENTARY FIN. INFO. Q3 2009 3 (2009), http://www.
rbc.com/investorrelations/ir-quarterly.html (At the end of 03 2009, RBC's Tier 1
capital ratio was 12.9%; total capital ratio was 14.4 %); TORoN-ro-DomiNION
BANK, 3RD QUARTER 2009 QUICK FACT-s 1 (2009), http://www.td.com/investor/
qr_2009.jsp (At the end of Q3 2009, TD Bank's Tier 1 capital ratio was 11.2%;
total capital ratio was 14.7%); BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, SUPPLEMENTARY FIN.
INFO. I (2009), http://scotiabank.com/images/en/filesaboutscotia/21511.pdf (at the
end of 03 2009, BNS' Tier 1 capital ratio was 10.4%; total capital ratio was 12.7%);
BANK OF MONTREAL, 2009 SUPPLEMENTARY FIN. INFO Q3 2 (2009), http://
www2.bmo.com/financialresults/0. divid-3_1angd-_navCode-228,00.html (At the
end of Q3 2009, BMO's Tier I capital ratio was 11.71%; total capital ratio was
14.32%.); CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE, SUPPLEMENTARY FIN. INFO
03 1 (2009). http://www.cibc.com/ca/investor-relations/quarterly-results/quarterly-
financial.html (At the end of the Q3 2009, CIBC's Tier 1 capital ratio was 12 %;
total capital ratio was 16.5 %.).
60. Nicholls, supra note 2, at 103 n.39 (citing CAR GUIDELINE, supra note 57, at 1.2,
which states that "'Capital' for this purpose, refers to the sum of the bank's ad-
justed net Tier I capital and adjusted net Tier 2 capital, as defined in section 2.5 of
the CAR guideline").
61. Id.
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tios alone.62 (In the United States, movement of assets and liabilities off
balance sheet may also remove them from the calculation of the bank's
tier 1 capital ratio. The effect of this was to create a particular incentive
for American banks to move liabilities off balance sheet. In Canada
there is not the same incentive to do so because use of the ACM as a
regulatory capitalization measurement tool prevents banks from hiding
certain of their assets and liabilities in this manner.) Canadian banks are
known to stay well below the maximum ACM. For instance, in the third
quarter of 2009, the ACMs for the Big Five banks ranged between 14.9 to
1 and 16.6 to 1.63 Thus, both capital adequacy requirements and strong
bank compliance have the effect of keeping bank risk taking in Canada
within regulatory acceptable levels.
A rough and ready way to illustrate how different bank regulation im-
pacted bank risk taking is through a comparison of leverage ratios. A
leverage (gearing) ratio is a figure that expresses a company's capital lev-
erage .6 4 The higher the figure, the more highly leveraged are the com-
pany's financial affairs, and thus the greater risk of financial loss. At the
outset of the financial crisis, the collective leveraged ratio for American
investment banks was 26.5, compared with 19.8 for Canada's largest
banks, which encompass both commercial and investment banking
operations.65
A further difference to note between American and Canadian bank
practices is the degree of bank reliance on short-term liquidity lines ex-
tended by other financial institutions .6 6 In the United States, banks de-
pend more on these types of liquidity support than do banks in Canada.
Therefore, American banks suffered from greater exposure to short-term
market swings during the economic crisis due to their greater intercon-
nectivity with one another. 67
62. Id.
63. ROYAL BANK OF CAN., supra note 51, at 1 (At the end of Q3 2009, RBC's assets to
capital multiple was 16.3 to 1); Press Release, CNW Group, TD Bank Financial
Group Reports Third Quarter 2009 Results (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.new-
swire.ca/en/releases/archive/August2009/27/c7986.htmI (At the end of Q3 2009, TD
Bank's assets to capital multiple was 16.6 to t); BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, 2009
THIRD-QUARTER REP'ORT TO- SHAREHOLDERs 29 (2009), http://scotiabank.coml
images/en/filesaboutscotia/2l5l2.pdf (At the end of Q3 2009, BNS' assets to capi-
tal multiple was 16.6 to 1); BANK OF MONTREAL, Q309 FINANCIAL RESIUTS 9
2009, http://www2.bmo.com/bmo/files/financial /20information /20slides/3l /
Q3%2009%20Financial%2OHighlights.pdf (At the end of Q3 2009, BMO's assets
to capital multiple was 14.9 to 1); Press Release, CNW Group, CIBC Announces
Third Quarter 2009 Results (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.newswire.calenlreleases/
arch ive/August2009/26/c665 1. htmlI (At the end of Q3 2009, CIBC's assets to capital
multiple was 16.2 to 1).
64. For more on "Gearing ratios" see A DICI-ONARY OF ACCOUNTING (Jonathan Law
& Gary Owe eds. 1999), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/
viewslENlRY.html~subview=Main&entry=tl7.et669 (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
65. Alexandre Laurin, Finn Poschmann & Robin Banerjee, International Policy Re-
sponses to the Financial Crisis: A Canadian Perspective (C.D. IHowe Inst.) Nov. 14,
2008. at 3. available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/ebricf-67.pdf.
66. Canadian Mortgages, supra note 24, at 3.
67. Id.
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Another critical difference between the two banking systems is the ab-
sence from the Canadian landscape of large investment banks that have
characterized the recent financial services landscape in the United States.
An investment bank is a financial institution that advises companies on
mergers and acquisitions and provides finance for industrial corporations
through its underwriting services .681 Investment banks thus differ from
commercial banks that provide a broad range of banking services, both to
individuals and businesses, including: operation of bank accounts, receipt
of deposits, personal and business lending activities, and the taking in and
paying out of currency.69
Regulations in the United States impose significantly lower capitaliza-
tion requirements on investment banking institutions than commercial
banks, a fact which is expected to change through regulatory amendments
stemming from the financial crisis .70 The flexibility was is due in large
part to the historical development of banking regulations and investment
banking in the United States, with the effect that American investment
banks are not subject to the more comprehensive regulatory regime ap-
plicable to commercial banks.7 1 Scant regulatory oversight coupled with
risky business activity thus contributed to the recent financial difficulties
faced by the American financial sector, especially large investment banks.
The environment for investment banking in Canada is considerably dif-
ferent-a contributing factor to the resilience of Canada's financial insti-
tutions in the economic crisis. Once again, Canadian conservatism in the
realm of banking stands as a major reason for the different approach to
investment banking. In Canada, the largest investment banking opera-
tions fall under the auspices of the Big Five banks. The result is that
investment banking comes under the close supervision of OFSI-the
same regulator responsible for commercial bank oversight. Therefore,
banking regulations, such as those pertaining to capitalization require-
ments, apply to investment banking branches through their application to
the bank as a whole. The absence of standalone investment banks-with
the regulatory challenges those entities posed in the United States-elim-
inated a number of high-risk financial institutions from the Canadian
banking sector. Indeed, prior to the beginning of the subprime crisis
there were five large, stand-alone investment banks in the United States.
Less than two years later there are none, all five having been devastated
68. For more on "Investment Bank," see A DicTriONARY OF BUSINESS AND MANAGE-
MENT (Jonathan Law ed. 2009), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com.ez
proxy.library.yorku.ca/views/ENTRY.htmi?subview=Main&entry t18.e3438.
69. For more on "commercial bank" see id.
70. Huw van Steenis. Nick Studer & James Davis. Outlook for In vestment Banking &
Capital Market Financials (Morgan Stanley), Apr. 1, 2008, at 8, available at http:/I
www.oliverwyman.com/de/pdf-files/Oliver-Wyman---Morgan-Stanley.-_-Outlook
for-Capital-Markets -and_-Investment-Banking-...April-08.pdf; see also Saute
Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules and Institutions: A Process for Re-
forming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881. 881 -930 (2009).
71. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale. Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?, 96 VA. L. REV. 707, 731-49 (2009).
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by the financial crisis .7 2 The recent financial failure of American invest-
ment banks is striking from a regulatory standpoint, highlighting the need
for effective and prudential regulation of investment banking to preserve
the safety and soundness of the financial services industry (and indeed
the economy) in both the United States and Canada.
As a final point, Canadian law imposes very strict requirements regard-
ing bank control, largely due to the fact that the Big Five banks account
for nearly ninety-two percent of domestic bank assets, making these
banks a subject of particular concern for regulators in matters relating to
the safety and soundness of banking practices and foreign control .73 His-
torically, the Canadian government has refused to grant the necessary
approval for significant changes in bank control, and in particular refused
to consent to mergers involving Canadian banks during the 1990s-when
many financial institutions around the world were conglomerating into
"'megabanks. 174 During this period, American banks were involved in
mergers and formed some of the world's largest financial institutions. For
example, the 1998 Travelers and Citibank merger that created Citigroup
became the first company to operate globally in all areas of finance.75 In
Canada, governmental control kept banks and banking practices along
the same fairly conservative trajectory they have followed for many
years-a fact that easily may not have been the case had banking regula-
tion permitted the creation of larger, more aggressive Canadian banks
through bank mergers or allowed for greater foreign influence in banking
operations through non-Canadian ownership.
This section has provided a basic overview of a number of key regula-
tory differences between the American and Canadian legislative
frameworks, particularly with respect to mortgage and financial systems
regulation. Though far from comprehensive, the comparison is telling,
and underlines the fact that, while the United States and Canada have
much in common, their legal frameworks governing various aspects of
financial regulation differ in some significant respects.
111. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CANADA
The global economic crisis has impacted economies around the world
in two primary ways, which are delineated in this paper as direct and
indirect effects. Direct effects refer to the immediate and localized im-
pact resulting from exposure to the true risk associated with highly lever-
aged financial products that has formed the root of the financial crisis.
One example of this is where a bank suffers a financial loss from holding
subprime mortgages that have become doubtful or bad debts. Indirect
effects describe all impacts of the financial crisis which are not direct ef-
72. Id. at 735.
73. Nicholls, supra note 2, at 19, 69-77.
74. BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: MERGERS AMD) AcoUtsrrloNS IN THE DIGITAL
ERA. 337-38 (2001).
75. Id. at 329-37.
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fects, including, for example, the impact on Canadian lumber exports to
the United States due to a drop in American new home construction. As
will be discussed in more detail below, this differentiation will serve to
help compare the impact of the financial crisis on Canada, which has ex-
perienced indirect effects of the financial crisis, with the United States,
which has suffered both direct and indirect effects.
This section details the major impact on Canada resulting from the
global economic crisis. Canada has suffered the indirect effects of the
global economic crisis-meaning that the underlying problems leading to
the crisis were not present. Nevertheless, specific sectors, and the Cana-
dian economy at large, have been negatively impacted. Of these indirect
effects, some have been highly visible, while others are more difficult to
ascertain. The first of the following subsections traces the effects of the
American subprime crisis to the Canadian third-party asset-backed com-
mercial paper ("ABCP") liquidity crisis, an event that was the most im-
mediate secondary impact of the economic crisis in Canada and was
significant from both securities and insolvency76 law perspectives. The
second subsection highlights several of the less quantifiable impacts of
the financial crisis that have weighted down the Canadian economy since
the start of the economic crisis.
A. A REACTION TO THE SUBPRIME CRIsIs: THE FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE OF THIRD-PARTY ACBP
The most immediate, and perhaps most concrete, impact of the global
financial crisis on Canada was the August 2007 liquidity crisis and ensuing
insolvency of third-party ABCP conduits (trusts). 77 Canadian third-party
ABCP is a highly liquid money market security, usually maturing in thirty
to ninety days, backed by an investment portfolio of securitized receiv-
ables, which is usually linked to issuing trusts by a credit default swap
agreement. The C$32 billion (approximately US$29.76 billion)78 insol-
vency marks the largest dollar value insolvency in Canadian history and
was a groundbreaking case for Canadian insolvency law because of the
76. Canadian legal terminology distinguishes between the terms "bankruptcy" and
"insolvency". Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. B 3 (1985)(illustrating a legal process conducted under statute) with Companies Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C., ch. C 36 (1985) (referring generally to the inability to
pay one's debts at they become due and to reorganization proceedings, which is
the closest Canadian equivalent to American Chapter 1t proceedings.).
77. In the time leading up to the third-party ABCP liquidity crisis there were two
primary types of ABCP in Canada, bank-backed ABCP and third-party (non-
bank) ABCP. Only third-party ABCP experienced a liquidity crisis in August
2007, resulting in insolvency proceedings. Bank-backed ABCP programs, while
faced with similar liquidity issues, received emergency funds from their sponsoring
institutions, thereby averting the prospect of insolvency. AI3CP Restructuring Plan
Gets Court Approval, CBC NEWS. Mar. 17. 2008. available at http://www.cbc.ca-
nioneystory2OO8O3J 7/a bcpcouirt.html.
78. American dollar value approximation based on mid-day exchange rate of
C$1.00=US$0.93 for August 15, 2007.
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scope and complexity of the proceedings. 79 The third-party ABCP liquid-
ity crisis resulted from a series of events triggered by a loss of investor
confidence in the underlying assets of ABCP trusts (which consisted pri-
marily of American consumer receivables) due to the outbreak of the
sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States. In Canada, several regu-
latory and advisory bodies have inquired into the third-party ABCP li-
quidity crisis with a view to the possible reform of existing regulatory
frameworks.80 These investigations have revealed that third-party ABCP.
was insufficiently regulated, leaving open the possibility of a liquidity cri-
sis such as the one experienced in August 2007.81
While the Canadian third-party ABCP liquidity crisis was triggered by
the loss of investor confidence, the lack of a sound regulatory framework
for ABCP programs is arguably to blame for allowing the development of
the very risky business practices with few checks and balances that left
ABCP programs needlessly financially vulnerable.
A detailed description of the structure of third-party ABCP programs
is beyond the scope of this article, and thus is not discussed at any length
here. Rather, the following gives a brief account of the regulatory and
business model shortcomings of ABCP. In very basic terms, ABCP was a
short term, highly liquid security for which issuing trusts were not re-
quired to file a prospectus or comply with the ordinary securities registra-
tion requirements. This was possible due to a legal exemption that
applied when one of a list of approved debt rating agencies gave ABCP
notes a rating that met the minimum rating requirement according to se-
curities law.8 2 Due to the lack of disclosure requirements, very little in-
formation about specific ABCP programs made its way into the
79. ATB Fin. v. Mercalfe & Mansfield Alternative Inv. II Corp., [2008] 240 0. A. C.
245, 1 8, 120-21(Can.).
80. See CAN. SEC. ADM'RS., SECURITIES REGULATORY PROPOSALS STEMMING FROM
THE 2007-08 CREDIT MARKET TURMOIL AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ABCP MARKET
IN CANADA (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/NewsRe-
leases/2008/nr 20081006_csa-abcp-con-paper.jsp; INV. INDUS. REGULATORY ORG.
OF CAN. (IIROC), REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE MANUFAC-
TURE AND) DISTRIBUTION 13Y IIROC MEMBER FIRMS OF THIRD-PARTY ASSET-
BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER IN CANADA (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter IIROC Re-
port], available at, http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx? Documentl D=3CA
B660DB44E4lC2875DD3DBD27FADEA&Language=en; John Chant, THE
ABCP CRISIS IN CANADA: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS (2009), available at http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/The%20ABCP%20Crisis%20in%20Canada%20-%20Chant.English.pdf.
81. Chant, supra note 80, at 12.
82. See National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions §2.35
(2005), available at http://www.albertasecurities.com/securitieslaw/Regulatory%20
Instruments/4/11832/_1661974%20vt0%20-%2045-106%201NSTRUMENT%20-
%20%20PUBLISHED.pdf; Notice: National Instrument 82-102 Mutual Funds, 22
O.S.C.B. (Supp.) 71 (1999), available at http://Ivww.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Se-
curities-Category8/rule 19991112 81-102_niinutualfund.pdf. Conduits selling
commercial paper have been able to avail themselves of prospectus and registra-
tion requirement since 1963 in Ontario, when the Ontario Securities Act was first
amended to include an exemption for purchases above the minimum principal or
denomination amount of $50,000. See IIROC Report, supra note 80, at 39.
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marketplace, giving rise to an increased risk that misinformation could
circulate among investors.
The main business structure issue apparent with third-party ABCP pro-
grams was that they were only financially tenable so long as the gov-
erning trust could continue to "roll paper" (issue new ABCP notes).83 To
backstop the possible negative consequences of the arrangement, third-
party ABCP conduits entered into credit line agreements with major
banks that allowed them to draw down funds in times of "general market
disruption."118 4  Unlike credit line agreements used by many American
ABCP programs, this Canadian style of liquidity support would not
foreseeably cover every instance where an ABCP trusts would require
emergency funds.815
The year 2007, superimposed on the regulatory and business model ec-
centricities of Canadian third-party ABCP, was the beginning of the
American subprime mortgage crisis. Investors in Canadian third-party
ABCP vaguely knew that their investment was backed by the American
consumer receivables that were now proclaimed by news media to be of
dubious value .86 (Later it was discovered that less than ten percent of the
assets backing third-party ABCP were subprime assets .)87 Without being
able to turn to full disclosure documents, ABCP noteholders did not
know the quantity or quality of the American consumer receivables to
which their investment was tied. Fearing the worst, nearly all large inves-
tors in Canadian third-party ABCP declined to purchase more notes, opt-
ing instead to redeem their outstanding ABCP.88 Unable to roll more
paper, third-party ABCP trusts attempted to draw down funds from their
credit line agreements to pay out maturing notes. Due to the more re-
strictive nature of Canadian style liquidity support arrangements, how-
ever, most lending institutions found that they were not obligated to
provide funds and accordingly denied the requests of ABCP trusts.8 9 Ca-
nadian ABCP programs-now in a situation of technical insolvency be-
cause of their inability to pay out maturing ABCP, hurriedly met with
83. See JIROC Report, supra note 79 at 5.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Financial System Review (Bank of Can., Ottawa, Ont., Can.) June 2003, at 46.
(American debt rating agencies Standard & Poor and Moody's were among those
to have pointed out the shortcomings of Canadian-style liquidity agreements prior
to the 2007 liquidity crisis).
86. See, e.g., Wall St Hit by Home Payment Fears, B.B.C. NEWS, Mar. 13, 1007, availa-
ble at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6447973.stm; Steven Pearlstein, 'No
Money Down' Falls Flat, THE WASHING [rON Pos-r, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http:/
/www. wash in gton postxcom/wp-dyn/con ten t/a rt icl e/2007/03/13/A R2007031 301733.
html; Justin Webb, Sub-prime Crisis Sours U.S. Dream, B.B.C. NEWS, Apr. 5, 2007,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6528387.stm.
87. Press Release, CNW Group, Pan-Canadian Investors Committee Announces Re-
structuring Plan for Third-Party ABCP. CNW GROUP (Dec. 23. 2007). available at
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/December2007/23/c5798.html.
88. Boyd Erman, Jacquie McNish, Tara Perkins & Heather Scoffield, Anatomy' of a
Panic, GLOI3EANDMAIL.COM, Nov. IT 2007 at 3, available at https://secure.globe
advisor.com/servlet/ArticeNews/story/gam/20071 t 17/RCOVE Rt7.
89. Id. at 5-6, 15.
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their largest investors and reached a standstill agreement (essentially
freezing the entire third-party ABCP market in Canada) to facilitate fur-
ther negotiations.91 1 Months of intense negotiations produced a draft re-
structuring plan for the twenty-two affected third-party ABCP trusts and
the negotiations committee proceeded with formal court supervised insol-
vency proceedings. 9'
The restructuring process tied up C$32 billion of investors' money for
approximately eighteen months.92 Upon completion of insolvency pro-
ceedings, investors were left with new, restructured notes worth only a
fraction of their pre-liquidity crisis value.93 It is expected that over time
the value of the notes will increase-an outcome facilitated by the fact
that the notes are free trading.94
The impact of this freeze on investors is not to be underestimated.
Most investors in third-party ABCP were large institutions that used the
highly liquid notes as a place to park working capital for short periods of
time. Commercial paper was an attractive place to store funds because it
offered a slightly higher rate of return than most similar investment vehi-
cles and (supposedly) could be sold at any time. Thus, the financial strain
placed on institutional investors by the market freeze, followed by the
loss suffered by taking the restructured and discounted notes, all at a time
of great market uncertainty, was considerable.
During the course of insolvency proceedings, it was discovered that
there were some 2,000 retail investors who held third-party ABCP (yet
another disconcerting revelation stemming from the ABCP debacle). 95
Retail investors had been sold third-party ABCP under somewhat dubi-
ous circumstances, due in large part to a lack of dealer comprehension of
the appropriateness of these securities for individual portfolios.96 Need-
less to say, these investors, most of whom had placed their life or retire-
ment savings in ABCP notes, were in a financially perilous position vis-a-
vis the restructuring plan. Fortunately for these investors, due to the con-
vergence of several factors, a special deal was struck with respect to retail
investor holdings. 97 Upon the successful completion of the restructuring
90. Id.
91. Forte, supra note 3, at 213, 219.
92. Restructuring of Canadian ABCP Completed, CBC NEWS, Jan. 21, 2009, available
at http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/01/21/abcpflow.html.
93. Sarra, suprat note 2 at 323.
94. Id.
95. Thomas Watson, Hunter and the Hunted, CANADIAN Bus., May 22, 2008, at 12,
available at http:/lwww.canadianbusiness.com/managing/strategy/article.jsp?con-
tent=20080522_198723_198723.
96. IIROC Report, suipra note 80, at 59-64.
97. Due to timing concerns, a single class of creditors was created under the CCAA,
with the approval of the court. ATS Fin. v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Inv. I/
Corp.. [2008]1240 0. A. C. 245. $ 24 (Can.). T1he CCAA requires that a restructur-
ing plan be approved by a double majority of creditors; a majority in number and
in claim value. Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. R.S.C.. ch. C 36. s. 6
(1985). Since there were approximately 2,000 retail investors, and only about 200
institutional investors, retail investor approval of the plan was crucial to its success.
Accordingly, investors with less than C$t million held in third-party ABCP notes
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plan, retail investors received the full dollar value of their investment (as
calculated just before the time of the market freeze). In essence, these
investors were made whole.9 8 By many accounts, this was the right result,
though the way that it came about was somewhat surprising from a Cana-
dian insolvency law perspective.
Due to the parties involved and the private nature of the negotiations,
the ABCP liquidity crisis and insolvency proceedings have been largely
overshadowed by the progressively worsening financial situation around
the globe. Hence, the third-party ABCP liquidity crisis is hardly a topic
known to most Canadians other than those actively connected to the se-
curities and financial sectors. Nevertheless, the financial failure of third-
party ABCP trusts serves as a striking example of regulatory failure in
the Canadian securities law context. In particular, if Canadian ABCP
trusts had in place global style liquidity support agreements (as was com-
mon practice for American ABCP programs) or had securities regulation
required appropriate disclosure, there likely would not have been a li-
quidity crisis to discuss. In other words, Canadian third-party ABCP
would have been better placed to weather this financial storm.
The Ontario Securities Commission has been investigating the third-
party ABCP debacle since it began and has recently issued enforcement
notices with hefty settlements to one of the largest ABCP trusts and four
if its former executives. 99 Regulator concern stems from conduct in July
2007 that suggests that these parties improperly used information regard-
ing third-party ABCP at a time when it had not yet been disclosed to the
public as required by securities law.110 Enforcement action in this case,
while it cannot directly deal with inadequacies in the governing regula-
tion of ABCP, arguably demonstrates the close attention paid by regula-
tors to ABCP programs following the liquidity crisis and the seriousness
of the situation from a regulatory perspective.
Governmental response to the third-party ABCP liquidity crisis has
largely come by way of studied proposals for reform stemming from sub-
stantial research reports prepared by regulatory and advisory bodies.
Three major reports on point have been prepared and released: a Consul-
tation Paper of the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA"), a re-
port by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
("IIROC"), and a research study prepared for the Expert Panel on Secur-
were exempted from the plan (effectively exempting nearly all retail investors).
ATB Fin., [2008] 240 0. A. C. at 245, $1 27 (Can.). The completed plan gave all
other creditors long-term notes that arc discounted from their previous value. Id. 91
24. The new notes are free trading. Id. Somewhat oddly, in this case use of a
single class of creditors for CCAA purposes required treating creditors differently
under the completed plan of arrangement. Id. $1 27.
98. Forte & Metcalfe, sutpra note 2. at 217 (citing ATB Fin., [2008] 240 0. A. C. 245).
99. Tara Perkins, Jacquie McNish & Boyd Erman, Regulators Seek Record Settlements,
GLOBE AND MAIL, July 25. 2009, at 132.
100. Id.
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ities Regulation ("Expert Panel").""u The GSA consultation paper ex-
amined the use of third-party ABCP conduits of currently available
prospectus exemption for commercial paper and the role played by debt
rating agencies. Included in its suggestions were that commercial paper
issuers no longer be permitted to use this exemption, and that considera-
tion be given to regulating debt-rating agencies and reducing regulator
reliance on such agencies in the future.1112 IIROC is the Canadian invest-
ment dealers' self-regulatory body; accordingly, its report was the result
of a substantial research project addressing problematic practices em-
ployed by its members that resulted in the sale of ABCP to retail inves-
tors.' 0 3 LIROC proposed a number of reforms to address the issues
identified with dealer practices in this regard.'10 4 It is noteworthy that all
IIROC-regulated entities involved with retail client holdings in third-
party ABCP instituted client relief plans upon news of the market freeze
of August 2007.105 The Expert Panel report provided a detailed account
of the factors leading up to the liquidity crisis as well as an examination of
the current regulatory framework and policy issues stemming from the
crisis.'106 The study concludes that the liquidity crisis was predictable and
preventable, and outlines the implications of this finding for securiti ,es
regulation.' 07 These three reports have outlined a number of suitable
suggestions regarding legal reform in this area; however, as of this writ-
ing, securities law reforms to address the problems in the current regula-
tory framework have yet to be designed and implemented.
B. FALLOUT FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Beyond the third-party ABCP debacle, the Canadian economy at large
has suffered the indirect effects of the global financial crisis. Highlighted
here are three broad interconnected areas that have been significantly
impacted: availability of credit, trade with the United States, and
unemployment.
Financial turmoil around the world, and particularly in the United
States, contributed to a tightening of credit in Canada-the so-called
"credit crunch." Following the failure of several banks in the United
States, Canadian banks, in typical conservative fashion, were hesitant to
extend funds. The trickle down effects of this reluctance resulted in a
general tightening in the availability of business and consumer credit. For
businesses, obtaining financing at all was at least challenging and at most
impossible, as the cost of capital also increased during the same period.
Notably, the third quarter of 2008 saw no initial public offerings on the
101. See CAN. SEC. ADM'RS, su pra note 80; IIROC Report, supra note 80; Chant, su pra
note 80.
102. See CAN. SEC. ADM'RS, suipra note 80. at 4.
103. IIROC Report. supra note 80, at xii.
104. Id. at 74.
105. Id. at 66.
106. See Chant, su pra note 80.
107. Id. at 42.
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Toronto Stock Exchange, an unprecedented first for Canada's senior eq-
uities market.'08 Further, the credit crunch, though only one of several
contributing factors, has ushered in the insolvencies of several blue-chip
companies with large operations or headquarters in Canada, including
Chrysler LLC,' 9 General Motors Canada,'' 0 and AbitibiBowater Inc.
(the third largest pulp and paper manufacturer in North America).'
The Government of Canada responded fairly swiftly to deteriorating
national credit conditions in order to inject liquidity and spur bank lend-
ing. Governmental action will be discussed below. (It should be noted
that while aimed at combating the credit crunch, many initiatives were
implemented with the intention of maintaining the international competi-
tiveness of Canadian banks at a time when other banks, particularly in
the United States, were receiving government backing.)' 12
Following the events of October 2008, the Bank of Canada instituted
term loan auctions where non-mortgage loans and other securitized fi-
nancial products were temporarily accepted as collateral at a forty per-
cent discount." 3 Further efforts aimed at expanding the amount of
money available in the banking system included directly increasing liquid-
ity available at the central bank's auctions, guaranteeing interbank lend-
ing, and loaning money directly to banks.1 4 Additionally, the
Department of Finance Canada expanded its purchases of MBS from
banks, purchasing C$25 billion in insured mortgages through CMHC
under provisions of the National Housing Act.' '5 All the while, the Bank
of Canada has continued to reduce its key interest rate, which is sitting at
0.25% as of this writing, slashed from a rate of three percent one year
108. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Survey of Canadian IPO Capital Markets: January
2008-September 2008. Oct. 2, 2008. http://www.pwc.com/en-CA/ca/media/publica-
tions/ipo-1008-en.pdf; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, No TSZ Activity Makes Third
Quarter IPO Market Lowest on Record, PwC survey shows TSX-V Also Lower,
Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.pwc.com/ca/en/media/release/2008-10-02-ipo-survey.jhtml.
109. Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler files for bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2009, at Al.
110. See Car Giant GM Files for Bankruptcy Protection, CBC NEWS, June 1, 2009, http:/
/www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/06/01/gm-bankrutcy-filing.htm.
111. See AbitibiBowater Files for Bankruptcy Protection, CBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/04/16/mtl-abitibi-0416.html; AbitiBowater,
Abitibi-Consolidated and Bowater Announce Executive Team for AbitibiBowater
(July 17, 2007), http://www.abitibibowater.com/media/archived-documents/Abitibi-
Consolidated/press/executive-team.aspx.
112. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Fin. Can., Government of Canada Strengthens
Canadian Advantage in Credit Markets (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.fin.gc.caln08/
08-080-eng.asp.
113. Bank of Can., Appendix: 15 October PRA Loan Auction, Oct. 14, 2008, http://
www.bankofcanada.calen/notices-fmd/2008/notI41008-appendix.html.
114. Id.; Durocher, supra note 32, at 2; Paul Vieria, Government-Backed Interbank
Lending Program Up and Running, FIN. Pos-r, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.financial
post.com/story.html?id=1332885.
115. Dep't of Fin. Can., Backgrounder: Support for Canadian Credit markets (Oct. 10,
2008), http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/data/08-075 t-eng.asp; See generally National
Housing Act, R.S.C., ch. N 11 (1985).
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The recently passed federal budget will also specifically target eco-
nomic issues pertaining to the financial crisis through a series of measures
dubbed "Canada's Economic Action Plan."" 7 This plan aims to do the
following:
" Help Canadians and stimulate spending by providing [C]$8.3 billion
for the Canada Skills and Transition Strategy to help Canadians
weather today's economic storm and to provide them with the neces-
sary training to prosper in tomorrow's economy. In addition, [C]$20
billion will be provided in personal income tax reductions over
2008-09 and the next five fiscal years.
" Improve access to financing and strengthen Canada's financial sys-
tem by providing up to [C]$200 billion through the Extraordinary
Financing Framework to improve access to financing for Canadian
consumers, households and businesses.' 18
Nearly a year after the financial chaos of October 2008, credit condi-
tions are more or less stable in Canada, though they have arguably not
returned to their pre-crisis strength. Canadian banks, having weathered
the brunt of the financial storm thus far, have maintained a solid financial
position, remained competitive in the marketplace, and preserved the
trust and confidence of Canadians-as exemplified through their success-
ful access to capital market financing as early as December of 2008 and
into 2009.' '9 Though consumer credit has been affected, low interests
rates, a fairly stable Canadian economy, and targeted government fund-
ing initiatives seem to have contributed to a flurry of home buying activ-
ity in major Canadian cities.' 20 By many accounts, these events appear to
be indicators of economic stability and perhaps even recovery. While Ca-
nada may be faring better than most nations, it is essential to remember
that Canadian recovery will doubtlessly be linked to that of other coun-
tries, particularly the United States.
As alluded to above, trade with the United States is an integral compo-
nent of the Canadian economy. Hence, factors affecting trade between
the Canada and the United States, especially Canadian exports, may have
116. Bank of Can., Key Interest Rate: Target for the Overnight Rate (2009), http:/l
www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/monetary/target.htm1.
117. Dep't of Fin., Government Acts to Provide the Economic Stimulus Canada Needs
(Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/09-029-eng.asp [hereinafter Government
Economic Stimulus].
118. Id., See Budget Implementation Act, 2009 S.C., ch. 2 (Can.).
119. See, e.g., Ogilvy Renault, RBC Completes a 'Bought Deal" Public Offering of
$225M of Preferred Shares, http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/en/clientWork_2357.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (On December 8, 2008, a few short months after the
international financial upheaval of October 2008, RBC completed a C$225 million
public offering underwritten on a bought deal basis); McCarthy Tdtrault, $400 Mil-
lion BMO Preferred Share Offering, http://www.mccarthy.ca/transactions and_-cases-detail.aspx?id=4711 (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (On June 19, 2009 BMiO is-
sued C$400 million shares which were underwritten on a bought deal basis).
120. Dave Ebner & Susan Krashinsky, Housing Sales Bounce Back Nationwide, GLO13E
AND MAIL, July 15, 2009, at Al.
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huge financial implications for Canada. Accordingly, the global financial
crisis, with the United States at the epicenter, has taken its toll on Cana-
dian-American trading activity. In particular, a number of events have
served to curtail American demand for Canadian exports. The compara-
tive strength of the Canadian dollar to the American dollar has negatively
impacted Canadian exports by making Canadian products more costly for
American purchasers.' 2'I Further, the slowdown in American new hous-
ing construction and automobile manufacturing have lessened demand
for Canadian softwood lumber as well as new cars and automotive com-
ponents, traditionally two of the major Canadian exports to the United
States. 122
The Government of Canada is obviously not in a position to single-
handedly solve problems afflicting trading activity between the United
States and Canada. Nevertheless, the federal government has responded
to challenges posed by declining American demand in several ways. One
example is its economic stimulus package for the Canadian construction
sector.' 23 Included in the aims of government action plan are the
following:
Stimulate housing construction by providing [C]$7.8 billion to build
quality housing, stimulate construction, encourage home ownership and
enhance energy efficiency.
Accelerate and expand the recent historic federal investment in infra-
structure with almost [C]$12 billion in new infrastructure stimulus fund-
ing over two years, creating new construction jobs, so that Canada
emerges from this economic crisis with more modern and
greener infrastructure.
Support businesses and communities to protect jobs and support
sectoral adjustment during this extraordinary crisis with [C]$7.5 billion in
extra support for sectors in need-automotive, forestry and manufactur-
ing-along with regions and communities.12 4
The expected benefits of these initiatives are manifold. A bustling con-
struction sector will maintain and create job opportunities for Canadians,
maintain or increase demand for Canadian exports such as softwood lum-
ber, and have trickle down effects, which will be positively felt by the
many businesses and industries that support or rely on the construction
industry.
121. Julian Beltrame, Bank of Canada Warns it Will Act to Stop Strong Loonie Front
Derailing Recovery. METRO NEws, Aug. 25, 2009, http://ca.news.yahoo.com/sl
capress/090825/business/economy.dollar.
122. Canada's Forestry Cut Down to Size, THE GAZEYI-E (MONTREAL), Jan. 5, 2008,
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/business/story.html?id alI70b8bb-26
2a-4e9c-aa2a-23f9tf17b4f4; Canadian Economy Shrinks, Exports Down. TORONTO-
STIAR, May 30, 2008. http://www.thestar.com/Businessarticle/434053.
123. See Government Economic Stimulus, supra note 117; Budget implementation Act,
2009 S.C., ch. 2 (Can.).
124. Government Economuic Stimulus, supra note 117.
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The apparent resilience of the Canadian financial system and timely
government intervention notwithstanding, the financial crisis has unfortu-
nately resulted in numerous job losses across Canada. Canadian unem-
ployment rates have risen in the past year, from 6.1% in July 2008, to
8.6% in July 2009. 125 Comparing national unemployment rates for July
2009, unemployment in Canada was slightly lower than in the United
States, which posted a national unemployment rate of 9.4%. 126 Hope-
fully for Canadians, Canada's Economic Action Plan, with its focus on
creating jobs in the most affected sectors, will not only stem the tide of
unemployment, but also help reverse the recent upward trend.
As highlighted above, the impacts of the economic crisis on Canada
have generally been less severe than those suffered by the United States
to date, largely due to a more conservative regulatory regime that back-
stopped the direct effects, as well as many indirect effects, of the financial
crisis. The indirect effects of the financial crisis on Canada, as exempli-
fied though the credit crunch, declining cross-border trade, and job losses,
serve to illustrate once again the interconnectedness of the Canadian
economy with the United States, as well as other countries around the
world. It may be that a better regulatory framework could have miti-
gated the negative consequences of the financial crisis in these areas;
however, the author contends it is more likely that no amount of regula-
tion could have completely insulated all aspects of the Canadian economy
from a financial crisis of this magnitude. Thus, those areas in need of
obvious regulatory reform should arguably take precedence. For in-
stance, the failure of third-party ABCP trusts demonstrates a hole in the
securities regulatory framework governing commercial paper-one,
which it appears, will be patched over by regulators in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to situate Canada and the Canadian econ-
omy in the context of the global economic crisis. While not an exhaustive
account of the Canadian experience, it serves to underline how fairly con-
servative Canadian financial regulation has shielded Canada from much
of the fallout of the global financial crisis. The Canadian position has
been explained in part by briefly describing a number of significant legis-
lative differences between the United States and Canada. Moreover, the
case of third-party ABCP illustrates the failure of the Canadian regula-
tory bulwark arguably caused economic repercussions that quite possibly
could have been avoided.
125. Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey, THE DAILY, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.stat-
can.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080808/dq080808a-eng.htm: Statistics Canada, Labour
Force Survey, THE DAILY, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-q uotidien/
090807/dq090807a-eng.htm.
126. Press Release. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor. Regional and State
Employment and Unemployment: July 2009. (Aug. 25. 2009). http://www.bls.gov/
news. release/arch ives/laus_0821 2009.pd f.
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Prudent regulation is by no means the remedy for every situation; how-
ever, this account illustrates some ways in which Canada has benefited
tremendously from its rather conservative regulatory regime. Insofar as
the financial crisis has increased awareness and sparked interest in regu-
latory reform around the globe, it is suggested that a close study of Cana-
dian financial regulation, as well as its recent successes and failures, could
prove informative to the efforts of reformers. At a minimum, an exami-
nation of the Canadian approach offers an interesting look at a more con-
servative regulatory culture with which to contrast the more risk inclined
frameworks of other leading countries around the world.
52 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
